Friday, November 29, 2019

Wasteland Essays - English-language Films, Teenage Wasteland

The Teenage Wasteland, why was it so good? Growing up in the recent generations is very challenging. Children at such young ages, even younger than teens have been faced with such perilous decisions. It is especially hard for teenagers to find acceptance at this point in their lives. Here is an instance that is so common in this day and age, yet this particular case is only fiction. A teenage boy named Donny has been going through a few changes in his appearance. His parents, Matt and Daisy, are somewhat disturbed yet they don?t say much to him. Then one day Daisy gets a call from Donny?s school administrator and tells her that his grades are attitude are dropping scale. He eventually gets kicked out of private school and does poorly in public school. Daisy was concerned and decided to take advice from the school and psychologist to get help from a highly reputable tutor, Calvin Applebee. Instead of Donny?s parents talking to their son they hire Cal, which tries to handle Donny?s lack of emotion and performance. Donny?s perfo rmance didn?t change with Cal, at least in the school aspect, but Cal kept reassuring Daisy and Matt that it would change and to give it more time. In result, Donny runs away after being sent home because he was expelled for being caught with drugs in his locker and months later he still has not returned home. Who is to blame? Should Daisy and Matt been more disciplined on Donny? Well, in Anne Tyler?s short story the Teenage

Monday, November 25, 2019

Free Essays on Goal Setting

Goal setting is defined as, â€Å"Attaining a specific standard of profficiency on a task, usually within a specified time limit.† Goals are categorized into three different areas. The first is subjective, which means just â€Å"having fun or participating in exercise.† The second category is general goals which includes â€Å"winning a championship or making a team.† The last category is specific goals which would be improving on one statistics. After in depth testing and observation experts say that setting goals do influence performance. The players strive to reach the goal set and facilitate themselves to accomplish, such as reaching a certain number of statistics. The Mechanist Theory describes goal setting better than other theories do. The mechanist theory says that goal setting influences in four ways. The first is that athletes direct their attention and actions towards accomplishing the goal. The second is helps performer mobilize their effort to doing what needs to be done to reach the goal. Thirdly, goal setting will give the athlete prolonged effort and increase their persistancy. And lastly, it allows one to employ new strategies and tactics, this pertains to coaches more than the player. There are certain goal setting guidelines that one should follow. The list consists of these, set specific goals, make them difficult but realistic, have them short and long range goals, have goals for practice and for the game and make the goals positive. There is also a list of goals for what not to do when setting them. They are not to have too many to soon, do not make them too general, do not just make them technique related goals and do not fail to modify if needed. Goals can be set by either the coach or the players. When coaches set goals they should record statistics and such to have for seeing improvements and for not accomplishing the goals. A main step in coaches having their teams set goals is the coach needs to step in when... Free Essays on Goal Setting Free Essays on Goal Setting Goal setting is defined as, â€Å"Attaining a specific standard of profficiency on a task, usually within a specified time limit.† Goals are categorized into three different areas. The first is subjective, which means just â€Å"having fun or participating in exercise.† The second category is general goals which includes â€Å"winning a championship or making a team.† The last category is specific goals which would be improving on one statistics. After in depth testing and observation experts say that setting goals do influence performance. The players strive to reach the goal set and facilitate themselves to accomplish, such as reaching a certain number of statistics. The Mechanist Theory describes goal setting better than other theories do. The mechanist theory says that goal setting influences in four ways. The first is that athletes direct their attention and actions towards accomplishing the goal. The second is helps performer mobilize their effort to doing what needs to be done to reach the goal. Thirdly, goal setting will give the athlete prolonged effort and increase their persistancy. And lastly, it allows one to employ new strategies and tactics, this pertains to coaches more than the player. There are certain goal setting guidelines that one should follow. The list consists of these, set specific goals, make them difficult but realistic, have them short and long range goals, have goals for practice and for the game and make the goals positive. There is also a list of goals for what not to do when setting them. They are not to have too many to soon, do not make them too general, do not just make them technique related goals and do not fail to modify if needed. Goals can be set by either the coach or the players. When coaches set goals they should record statistics and such to have for seeing improvements and for not accomplishing the goals. A main step in coaches having their teams set goals is the coach needs to step in when...

Friday, November 22, 2019

Non Humans and Graphics‏ Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 4500 words

Non Humans and Graphics† - Essay Example Which is vry tru. Howvr it is anothr mattr that natural slction and cultural slction, that will ultimatly dcid on th "popularity" of an art don't function in th sam way. Anyhow How can w rmov th cultural bias or th human bias that w hav in our art forms .Answrs in Artificial Lif: Artificial lif may b dfind as "A fild of study dvotd to undrstanding lif by attmpting to driv gnral thoris undrlying biological phnomna, and rcrating ths dynamics in othr physical mdia - such as computrs - making thm accssibl to nw kinds of xprimntal manipulation and tsting. This scintific rsarch links biology and computr scinc."1 Most of th A-Lif simulations today can not b considrd truly aliv, as thy still can not show som proprtis of truly aliv systms and also that thy hav considrabl human bias in dsign. Howvr thr ar two viws that hav xistd on th whol ida of Artificial Lif and th xtnt it can go. Strong A-Lif is xactly th rvrs. John Von Numann onc rmarkd "lif is a procss which can b abstractd away from any particular mdium". In rcnt tims cologist Tom Ray dclard that his computr simulation Tirra was not a simulation of lif but a synthsis of lif. In Tirra, computr programms compt for CPU tim and accss to th main mmory. Ths programs ar also volvabl, can rplicat, mutat and rcombin. . . Today graphic dsign is rcognizd through th mass production of publications, advrtising, and printd litratur, but during th Mdival and Rnaissanc Tims, graphic dsign was still at its roots. DurinG th lat5600S it5was m@nUsCripps tha showd5arlY Hints5of gap)c drign and tipogPa0hic ,mNtc, but baaus of th% Prgd%ctign and5b2atO2 of th xt, th5manuscri0ts wr still v2y5duah cNnsi$rd an art. n o"dr5to undrstand this possibility it is ncssary to look at th procss in which manuscripts and othr publications wr cratd from 680-1500 C, how w distinguish graphic dsign, how w distinguish art, and how w undrstand thm as two compltly diffrnt forms of xprssion and communication. 2 In ordr to undrstand it's plac during th Mdival and Rnaissanc tims, it is important to undrstand what w dfin as graphic dsign and what w dfin as art. Rfrring to Malcolm Barnard's svral points in Grapic Dsign as Coemunication, graphic dsign is a unitrsally visual languag that can b mass producd and clarly communicats an ida, product, oC campaign in a "'forthright' and 'plain' fashion" (Barnard 163). Art on th othr hand is supposd to b th xact opposit; not univrsal, basd on intrprtation, cratd as a product of and by th xprssion of th artist (not a clint), and ambiguous. With ths dfinitions said, it is important to now discuss graphic dsign and art's plac during th Mdival and naissanc Tims. Starting in th lat 600s,5manusCrIpts wr prodUcd by monks or Fujs and wr eaD iThr "y ! 3ingl5artist or a5group. At5this Ti,, any f/rm of tXt that5was cratd was dmN5bx (and. This wittn languag5cAf graphically B cAtgorizd as Fodhic, And mor spciFicalli th5f/Ft Styl can5b rfRrd5to as sCriPtoRi5m Du to tH fact5tha5svral or oN

Wednesday, November 20, 2019

Segmentation and Target Market Paper Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Segmentation and Target Market Paper - Essay Example It is the process of splitting customers in a market into different groups (McDonald and Dunbar, 2012). Industries can segment the target market according to either large or small consumer numbers, or their geographic location. A target market refers to a group of organizations or people, for which and industry develops and implements strategic plans so as to meet the group’s needs. The essay that follows discusses on segmentation and target market within the Nike Company. Nike Company is one of the largest athletic sport equipment companies in the world. It was founded by Phil Knight, a former Oregon University coach, and has its headquarter Oregon, Beaverton (Hill and Jones, 2010). It is one of the companies that have had a tremendous growth over the past years. It has segmented markets in different areas, which include Oregon, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Europe and Japan (Porter and Norton, 2013). Its inclusion of services in other areas results from the company’s grow th and increased service need in the areas. Market Segmentation in Nike Company Demographic Characteristics This is dividing a company’s service provision according to age, race, gender, and social class, among others (Gitman and McDaniel, 2009). ... Nike’s segmentation of business in the various locations aims at meeting the same need for sport wears both to the young and the aged. Income also contributes to Nike’s market segmentation to other areas. For example, Japan is a country whose income is high due to automobile and other industries. However, it might not have the ability to produce wears suitable for sporting as those Nike Company produces. The need for proper sport wears gives Nike to expand its services to Japan. The company also produces wears for all genders where different clothes exist for women and men players. The target market in this market segment is both male and female athletes who exist in the regions around Nike Headquarters, and those in other countries like Japan. Psychographic Characteristics This involves segregating market in terms of people’s common activities, interests, and opinions (Gitman and McDaniel, 2009). Nike Company’s headquarter is in a location where people ha ve a common interest in sporting. The founder aimed at providing state-of-the-art athletic shoes that convince customers that they are the best-suited and necessary for sporting and athletic interests in the region (Hill and Jones, 2010). The psychographic segmentation by Nike targets sales from athletes from the Oregon region who have an interest in sports and need comfortable shoes to support them in their sporting activities. As Hill and Jones (2010) point, in the past Nike concentrated on making shoes for basketball and track market segments more than other sports like golf and soccer among others, but later realized that engaging in the making shoes for other sporting activities can bring a lot of profits. This made the

Monday, November 18, 2019

The justice in United Arab Emirates Research Paper

The justice in United Arab Emirates - Research Paper Example This phenomenon is more intensive in countries where culture has been considered as indispensable part of law, such as in the case of Islamic countries. Current paper presents the justice system of UAE, an Arab country with a significant economic power. The efforts of UAE’s government to develop the country’s economic and social framework are highly supported by the national legal system, which is appropriately aligned with the rules of Islamic law. The structure and the elements of UAE’s justice system indicate a strong dependency on culture. At the same time, the influence of the particular justice system by similar systems of the West cannot be ignored. Aly Khedr and Bassam (2010) note that the influences of Western legislation on the UAE’s justice system are clear. Moreover, the key legislative text that has affected UAE’s justice system is the Egypt code which was first appeared near the end of the 19th century (Aly Khedr and Bassam 2010). Also , the adoption of the Civil law by UAE denotes the willingness of the country’s governments to establish a long term relationship between UAE’s justice system and the French law, which has been the basis of the Civil law (Aly Khedr and Bassam 2010). ... The first appearance of UAE’s justice system can be related to the country’s first appearance in the international community, around in 1971 (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). It was then that the first rules of law for regulating the country’s various issues were established (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). At that period, the development of the country’s legal system was based on laws of two different types: a) the federal laws and b) the laws issued by Decrees (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). The laws of the first category were first introduced by the Cabinet and were then brought before the Federal National Council in order to be verified, as legislative texts. Up to that level, a legislative text would remain a bill; for becoming a law, a bill should be then brought to the country’s President who has the power to bring the bill to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). This is the common legislative process as applied in UAE since the country’s first establishment. In addition, there is the option of laws that are promoted as decrees (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). These laws can be promoted only in cases of emergency when critical issues need to be regulated. These laws can be promoted by the country’s President, in cooperation with the Cabinet (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). At lower level, laws can be promoted for regulating issues at the level of emirates, i.e. at not at federal level (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). Reference should be made here to the Cabinet decisions which are placed, in terms of their power, between the laws brought by decree and the common laws (Abu Dhabi e-government 2012). This means that the decisions of Cabinet are of increased power compared to the laws of Emirates, a fact that it is crucial any

Saturday, November 16, 2019

Basic resource for any organisation

Basic resource for any organisation Introduction: Information is basic resource for any organisation to its management. If the information is available on time its really effective for the management in its operations. The term information system usually refers to a system based on computer which is designed to support the operation, management and decision function. Management information system collects, transmit, process, store information and the system convert this data for management to make decisions and the strategy in the organisation. Reason for information system strategy First let me clear the misunderstanding for those who dont understand that whatever we do we have a strategy.im sure everything we do we have an objective to achieve that plan we make a plan that plan is strategy. Problem is strategy can be good or it can be bad or we may not have spotted that we can do much better if take the opportunity and environment into account. But there can be certain things give us a push to adopt a strategy and to achieve the better results for our business. There are two distinct phases, the first one is quantitative and the second one is qualitative. The first part we talk about the research of different organisations. In each organisation we will talk about different key stake holders in formulation of strategy process. This phase of the research will be started when different stakeholders will be interviewed over 100 interviews have been conducted so far. For the second phase the potential sample size will be every HEI in the UK. The first method tool which is being used to get samples in the first part is based on interviews and observation from which case studies are being created. The case studies created in part one will then be used to enlarge and increase upon present theory to grow a survey. This will be directed, using the results already recognized in qualitative research and different other organisations. This will bring the experimental sample to lots of other organisation which is adequate to learn any main defects in the survey. The second data-gathering tool will be a organized survey. The small size of the real people means that the survey can be given in all the organisations to at smallest three key stake holders or alliance frontrunners. Earl suggests a multiple methodology to formulate an information systems strategy. Earls multiple methodologies Earls multiple methodology provides a means of: Clarification of the business needs and strategy in information systems terms. Evaluation of current information systems provision and use. Innovation of new strategic opportunities. 1. Top down clarification Earls definition of a suitable method to clarify business needs in IS terms: ‘A methodology that is easily understood and used by line and general managers, it can cope with varying robustness of business strategy, it does not consume too much time or resource, it can be repeated as circumstances inevitably change and, as a result of these needs and because it could not achieve anything else, it points to directional IS needs and not detailed specifications. The ‘Critical Success factors approach meets many of the requirements of the definition. There are otherssee ‘Strategic Management and Information Systems Wendy Robson See ‘IT Strategy for Business Joe Peppard 2. Bottom Up evaluation Most organisations only have a vague understanding of the potential and capacity of their present IT systems. The technical perspective and backroom perception of IT may create a barrier. To understand the present systems a bottom up analysis is carried out. This involves an audit or survey. As well as the technical detail the user/specialist interface is examined. The value of the system to the organisation must also be ascertained. In this evaluation the following questions must be asked: How reliable is the system? How easy is it to maintain? How cost effective is it? What is the impact on the business? How easy is it to use? How often is it used? What is the state of our specialist user relationship? Other considerations might be the interactivity of the systems. These interactions and the evaluation can be shown graphically using systems maps or other means. The present systems can then be examined for strengths and weaknesses. The top-down business approach and the bottom-up systems approach do not provide an opportunity to exploit radical new ideas for exploiting the competitive advantage of IT. The business approach examines the ‘what and does not examine the ‘hows. The bottom-up approach is constrains radical thinking by the presence of the evaluation process and the strengths and weaknesses of the existing systems. A more detached approach is needed. 3. inside out thinking lateral thinking It is often inspiration and creativity that produces the bright spark ideas that can produce the beginnings of an IS strategy for competitive advantage. Ideas brought from unrelated sectors can often be successfully applied. The right atmosphere must be nurtured to produce this creativity. Runge suggests the following six characteristics associated with IT innovation|: The idea often emanates from a commercial manager. The idea was backed by a senior manager who became the project champion. The competitive advantage was added to an existing system; evolutionary process. The idea was developed outside of the IT control constraints. Customers were involved in the development. The application was given a high profile and was marketed. External Analysis The three legs of Earls multiple methodologies have considered IS strategy from an internal perspective. It is important to also view this strategy from an external point of view i.e. competitors, customers, consumers etc. There are techniques that can help clarify this approach. The SWOTmethod is a suitable candidate that explores both internal and external perspectives. A technique such as SWOT is useful when considering an external view of the three legs of the multiple strategies. Porters five forces model is a useful model for considering the external perspective on IS strategy. Boddy et al suggest that Porters model can be used to construct an IS strategy. Considerations when using the multiple methodologies. The use of methodologies does not mean a ‘cookbook attitude should be taken the implementation of strategies. Methodologies are useful overall frameworks but the context in which they are used needs consideration as well as experience. Experience suggests that: Significant differences existed in different firms; IS strategy formulation inherently seemed a more complex matter in some firms than others; and approaches in practice did not always match either the popular prescriptions or the accounts in case documented articles. Infrastructure-led may emphasise leg 2 bottom-up approach. Business-led may emphasise leg 1 top-down approach. Opportunity-led may emphasise leg 3 inside-out. Alternative approaches There are many other approaches in structuring IS strategy. One such approach is Porters five forces model. This is also useful in conjunction with Earls methodology. The following is reproduced from Body et al. IS changes the basis of competition: opportunities and threats Computer-based information systems are changing competitive conditions in many Indus-tries. There are many tools and techniques which can be used to analyse the relationship between strategy and information systems, depending on their purpose. In this book we can only illustrate one of these approaches, and the Five Forces model originally developed by Michael Porter seems the most appropriate to introduce. It can be used at the level of the individual firm to assess the possible impact of information systems on the competitive position of the firm. A comprehensive account of the many other perspectives on the topic will be found in Robson (1997). Figure 4.5 is based on Porters framework, and a show that IS represents an opportunity to secure a strategic advantage by using it to strengthen one or more of these forces. Similarly, it represents a competitive threat, if other organisations are able to use IS more effectively in these ways. Information systems and the threat of new entrants Managers can use IS on this force by using it to reduce the threat from new entrants by raising barriers, or by using it themselves to enter new markets. Using information systems to raise entry barriers The Caterpillar case illustrates that the manufacturer of the machine links the customer electronically with the service organisation. Because of that electronic link, it is not easy for a customer to go to another service organisation for repair and maintenance. This strengthens Caterpillars position as a manufacturer and as a service provider. The system is so complicated, advanced and expensive that it is hard for existing competitors to imitate. It is even more difficult for new entrants in this market to develop a similar system. The box gives two other examples. In the IS industry itself ‘setting the standard is very important to gaining a strong position. Most customers want to use equipment that has become established as the industry standard. Examples are Microsoft word-processing software, Intel computer chips and Netscape Internet browsers. It is very hard for new entrants to overcome these entry barriers, leading to a winner takes all situation in many sectors of the market. Using IS to enter markets more easily The Caterpillar case illustrates how the company uses its information system to attain a stronger position in the maintenance market. The system can strengthen the relationship with buyers of Caterpillar equipment and provide them with a broad after-sales service. Caterpillar becomes a stronger competitor of independent maintenance companies in new markets. Information systems and the threat of substitutes Companies can use information systems to alter this force by differentiating their products, or by creating new ones which they can use to threaten competitors. Using information systems to differentiate products and services The Caterpillar case shows the company using the information system mainly to improve the speed and quality of customer service. When the system notes deterioration the service starts immediately and the very capital-intensive machine will be repaired soon. This saves the customer a great deal of money. Other companies use the Internet to create and orchestrate active customer communities. Examples include Kraft (www.kraftfoods.com), Intel (www.intel.com), Apple (www.apple.com) and Harley Davidson (www.harley-davidson.com). Through these communities the companies become close to their customers. They can learn and innovate with product or service improvements that would otherwise be impossible. The research summary box below explains why it is essential for information service providers to differentiate their products. Using information systems to create new products and services Telephone and Internet banking are relatively new phenomena which have only become possible with new systems. The same is true of companies that use the power of database technology to offer new services in customer relationship management and direct market-in. Wide Internet access has generated a huge increase in businesses offering new services. These include electronic auctions, search engines, electronic retailers, electronic hubs (Data and Segev, 1999; Timmers, 2000; Kaplan, 2000), and Internet providers. Caterpillar created new maintenance services, and the next box gives another example. Information systems and the bargaining power of suppliers Increasing power of suppliers can increase their power by using information systems to track much more closely the costs of providing services to customers. They can set prices accordingly, or decide that they do not want a particular piece of business. For example, airlines use yield management systems to track actual reservations against traffic forecasts for any flight, and then adjust prices for the remaining seats to maximise revenue. Stepanekz (1999) reports how Weyerhaeuser Doors uses an Internet-based system to, amongst other things; manage orders from its distributors. This allows the company to manage its internal processes more efficiently, but also to assess much more accurately the value of each order, and the overall performance of its distributors. This enables it to refuse unprofitable orders, and to be more selective about the distributors which it supplies. Customer relationship management systems are a currently popular example of suppliers ability to track customers requirements more accuratel y, thus increasing the suppliers power over the customer. Decreasing power of suppliers Information systems can also be used the other way around. Customers can use information systems to strengthen their position in the marketplace at the expense of suppliers power. Ford and General Motors have set up electronic marketplaces and urge their suppliers to use that system to match their supply with the demand of Ford and GM. The Economist (6 November 1999) commented: Ford and GMs e-business revolution will not be confined to them alone. Their decision to go online will ripple through the 50,000 or so firms they trade with. The car makers are careful to say that none of their suppliers will be compelled to use their new portals, preferring simply to express that the benefits-cost savings, the access to new customers, the faster time to market, the sheer value of the information will make it an obvious choice. But the reality is different. Ford and GM are investing a lot in their e-business infrastructure and great hopes are riding on it. Suppliers that want to continue to do business the old way will rapidly become ex-suppliers and before long ex-companies. The next section about the use of information systems to change the power of buyers explores this theme further. This illustrates that information systems are increasingly inter-organisational phenomena, rather than hidden back-office systems. Inter-organisational systems can be used to co-operate as well as to compete with business partners, whether suppliers or customers. Powerful parties tend to urge less powerful ones to adopt their systems. Information systems and the bargaining power of buyers a good example of the balance of power being altered is when retail chains use modern communication technologies to make electronic links with their suppliers. Such systems reduce inventory costs and warehouse expenses and improve fulfilment time and information flows. For instance, they encouraged the further concentration of retailing firms which then had much more power over their suppliers. The retailers computer continually monitors its suppliers finished goods inventories, factory scheduling, and commitments against its schedule. The purpose is to ensure the stores always have adequate stocks. A supplier that is unwilling to join the system is likely to lose business. The box illustrates how Wal-Mart used this idea. More generally, buyers can use the web to access more suppliers, and to compare prices for standard commodities much more widely than was practical with earlier technologies. Information systems and the intensity of rivalry two ways of using information systems in the process of competitive rivalry are by reducing costs and through more effective management. Using IS to reduce costs On-line inventory systems make it possible to make radical changes in manufacturing supply systems. This greatly reduces inventory levels, and the costs associated with them. Car manufacturers are only invoiced for components when the completed assembly leaves the factory. When the system knows that X headlamps have been used, it passes the information to the component supplier. They send an (electronic) invoice for the components used, and supply replacements. There are similar systems in retailing, where suppliers like Unilever and Procter Gamble manage the inventory of their biggest customers. These inter-organisational systems reduce inventory costs but not only through lower inventory levels. They also reduce the need for working capital and allow a (smaller) purchasing department to focus on non-routine orders and strategic supply matters. The Internet enables large companies to transfer their purchasing operations to the web. Secure web sites connect suppliers, business partners and customers all over the world. This makes it easier for new suppliers to bid for a share of the available business, makes costs more transparent, and improves the administrative efficiency of the supply process. Using IS to enable more effective management A travel agents branch accounting system can now provide detailed patterns of business to managers, enabling them to monitor trends more closely, and to take better-informed pricing and promotional decisions. Another example is Ahold, a Dutch retailer, which achieved much greater performance in the supply chain by using its data-mining capability and knowledge extraction in its customer database. Management information systems can expand the span of control of individual managers, which can support the flattening of organisations. These examples show that information systems may become opportunities for creating, supporting or changing generic strategies. On the other hand competitors have similar opportunities there are also costs and risks associated with using information systems in this way. IS can also be a threat New entrants in the financial services sector have been able to introduce telephone bank-in through call centres very quickly. They were able to take advantage of the fact that they did not have an established branch network, and so could use the new technology very quickly. The technology worked to the disadvantage of established banks with many local offices. They found it costly to close branches. The technology was an advantage to the new, a disadvantage to the old. This illustrates a more general point that, for all the potential opportunities, IS can also be a threat. Information systems enable new competition Computer-based information systems represent opportunities for one business and threats to another company. In retailing, large chains have benefited at the expense of smaller shops, large suppliers have benefited at the expense of smaller ones, and large retailers have more power over suppliers. Any use of IS by one company to enter a new market, reduce costs and so on, is a potential threat to a competitor. They lose out if they have not seen the possibility, or have managed implementation less effectively. The London Stock Exchange is threatened by the fact that modern technology allows major institutions to trade shares directly, rather than use the market institution. The problem is increased by the fact that competing exchanges have implemented new information systems more effectively. They are likely to gain a larger share of a smaller market. Information systems place new demands on management time Implementing a major system takes a great deal of management time a cost that managers rarely include when evaluating investments. They require managers to look inward at (important) operational problems of staff, system design, and security. The danger is that they do not look at (even more important) issues of how to use the systems for strategic advantage. In other words: managers are often balancing between a ‘problem orientation and an ‘opportunity orientation. Senior management frequently underestimates the resources required to implement new information systems, especially of managing the many organisational implications. Implementing an information system successfully is difficult many research reports comment on the difficulties of implementing information systems. This is especially true of systems which involve many stakeholders with different interests or those which are innovative in other respects. They often take place in an uncertain environment, from a competitive as well as from a technological point of view. These uncertainties make it difficult to plan a change over a longer time. At the same time, the stakes are getting higher in terms of costs, people and other resources. Even when applications work, there may be downsides Managers often buy in expertise for development, operations and consultancy. These suppliers become the main experts of a companys IS resource. This dependency can be misused. Their lack of knowledge and insight in the organisation causes major problems. They have difficulty in negotiating successfully with the external providers and crucial company knowledge becomes the asset of other companies. References Achterberg, J.S., Gerrit, A. and Heng, M.S.H. (1991) Information systems research in the post-modern period. In Nissen, H.E., Klein, H.K. and Hirschheim, R. (eds.) Information Systems Research: Contemporary Approaches and Emergent Traditions. Elsevier Science Publishers BV, North Holland. Anderson, M. (1992) Implementing an information infrastructure strategy: the University of Edinburgh experience. University Computing Antill, L. (1991) Selection of a research method. In Nissen, H.E., Klein, H.K. and Hirschheim, R. (eds) Information Systems Research: Contemporary Approaches and Emergent Traditions. Elsevier Science Publishers BV, North Holland. Baroundi, J.J. and Orlikowski, W.J. (1988) A short form measure of user information satisfaction: pychometric evaluation and notes on use. Journal of Management Information Systems Boaden, R. and Lockett, G. (1991) Information technology, information systems and information management: definition and development. European Journal of Information Systems Breaks, M. (1991) Information systems strategies. British Journal of Academic Librarianship Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life. Ashgate Publishers. Campbell, W.G. and Fiske, D. (1959) Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait- multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin Creswell, J.W. (1994) Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Sage Publications.Return to text Fitzgerald, E.P (1993) Success measures for information systems strategic planning. Journal of Strategic Information Systems Galliers, R.D. (1991) Strategic information systems planning: myths reality and guidelines for successful implementation. European Journal of Information Systems

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

Science Inquiry Essay -- essays research papers

Inquiry 2: Force with varied mass Introduction: In this inquiry the relationship between force and mass was studied. This inquiry presents a question: when mass is increased is the force required to move it at a constant velocity increased, and how large will the increase be? It is obvious that more massive objects takes more force to move but the increase will be either linear or exponential. To hypothesize this point drawing from empirical data is necessary. When pulling an object on the ground it is discovered that to drag a four-kilogram object is not four times harder than dragging a two-kilogram object. I hypothesize that increasing the mass will increase the force needed to move the mass at a constant rate, these increases will have a liner relationship. Materials and Methods: In the experiment these materials were used in the following ways. A piece of Veneer wood was used as the surface to pull the object over. Placed on top of this was a rectangular wood block weighing 0.148-kg (1.45 N/ 9.80 m/s/s). A string was attached to the wood block and then a loop was made at the end of the string so a Newton scale could be attached to determine the force. The block was placed on the Veneer and drug for about 0.6 m at a constant speed to determine the force needed to pull the block at a constant speed. The force was read off of the Newton scale, this was difficult because the scale was in motion pulling the object. To increase the mass weights were placed on the top of the ...

Monday, November 11, 2019

Quick Books Essay

.Rissy Montoya Acct 31 Information Technology (IT) is a foundation for conducting business today. It plays a critical role in increasing productivity of firms and entire nation. It is proven that firms who invested in IT have experienced continued growth in productivity and efficiency. Many companies' survival and even existence without use of IT is unimaginable. IT has become the largest component of capital investment for companies in the United States and many other countries. Accounting/Finance application systems and QuickBooks let you manage your business with a little or no experience.All three application systems allow the users to manage the companies' capital including bookkeeping, inventory, non-inventory & service items, sales orders, purchase orders, and reports. It allows the companies to keep tracking of the financial assets and at the same time have the information the accountant needs. Using the accounting/finance application system, makes it easier to enter and proc ess the data rather than manually enter and process the data.. QuickBooks is an accounting software package which is developed by Intuit, Inc. It was launched in the 90's and since than it is one of the market leaders in accounting software.The software was designed to help the small business owners who had no formal accounting training. Very shortly after the introduction, there was no doubt that the product is going to be a hit. With a deep focus for the non-accountant, and a lower price than the competitor's products, it outsmarted its competitions. Intuit states that the company's mission is to create new ways to manage personal finances and small businesses that are so profound and simple, customers cannot Imagine going back to the old way QuickBooks created an application that is most commonly used accounting product for small businesses QuickBooks ProThe world today is in the computer age. Almost everyone now has a computer or access to a computer. Now that almost everyone kn ows how to use a computer, almost every business has one. Business’s before had to rely on people to do all the accounting by hand, and doing the accounting for a business used to take a lot of man-hours to complete. Business’s slowly moved into letting computers do a lot of the work for them, but they still had people to check on the computers because the applications that they were using would sometimes screw up and cause a lot of confusion or even loss of money.With the latest application QuickBooks Pro 2011, there is little need for any backup measures. This application does everything that the business needs to do, manage your business, track time, do payroll, develop estimates, and much more. QuickBooks Pro 2011 quickly finds the reports you need with the Report Finder, shows you critical information about your business at a glance with Company and Customer Centers, and track Features of QuickBooks that will help the company implement sound internal control polic ies and procedures; Access to accounting records should be limited to designated individuals.Once a transaction has been entered, the ability to change or delete it entirely should be limited to some other individual, preferably an accounting manager. Financial statements should be prepared monthly, with gross profit percentage and expense percentages, so that management can question apparent errors or omissions. The monthly financial statements should be comparative, i. e. show last year’s figures alongside this year’s, preferably with percentages as well as dollar amounts, to make apparent any significant variations in revenue or expense items that should be investigated for possible error or even fraud.Budgets should be prepared, and variances between actual and budgeted figures should be shown on budgetary income statements each month. The deficiencies with this program for internal control starts when you initially set up your accounts, you enter in your beginning account balance amounts (unless you are a brand new company with no activity). The problem is that if you do not input an amount, or input an amount correctly, the difference will go to Opening Balance Equity.If it is not fixed, it will stay there indefinitely. QuickBooks will allow you to enter a transaction for any date that you wish. While this is convenient for purposes of making projections, it can have bad consequences if you go backwards. QuickBooks retains every transaction you enter from the day you started using it. While this is useful to get historical information, on a practical basis, the file sizes can easily get large enough to be unmanageable and slow your computer. Conclucion

Saturday, November 9, 2019

Only the Strong Survive

January 17, 2013 Industry Report Shipbuilding (Neutral) Only the strong survive Offshore orders to drive growth The shipbuilding industry is in a situation similar to that of 2002. In 2013, plunging order volume and weak new building prices are fueling intensifying competition. In 2002, shipbuilding shares rose because of an increase in orders, but then quickly fell on concerns over weak new building prices, which caused earnings to stagnate. For a period in 2002, shipbuilders went into red. There is a big difference between the shipbuilding market of 2002 and 2013, however.In 2013, a few, major shipbuilders with an edge in the construction of offshore plants are expanding order backlogs due to growing demand for offshore plants. We anticipate investments in offshore E&P projects will continue to rise, as we expect oil prices will remain high. We anticipate major shipbuilders will offset sluggishness in the commercial vessels market with their offshore-plant businesses. Daewoo Securi ties Co. , Ltd. Ki-jong Sung +822-768-3263 kijong. [email  protected] com Ryan Kang +822-768-3065 ryan. [email  protected] om Three major catalysts in 2013 1) Increase in new orders despite depressed market conditions. 2) Improved cash flow and balance sheets. 3) Growing competitive gap between shipbuilders due to accelerated restructuring. Historic low P/B presents attractive valuations We expect Korean shipbuilders will be able to maintain their competitive edge regardless of the depressed shipbuilding market. Although shipbuilding shares currently trade at a P/B of 1. 0x, we believe they have the potential trade at a P/B of 1. 2x.We recommend Hyundai Heavy Industries (009540 KS/Buy/TP: W280,000), and Samsung Heavy Industries (010140 KS/Buy/TP: W46,200) out of the large shipbuilders. We find Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (010620 KS/Buy/TP: W148,000) to be the best among shipbuilders that focus on mid-to-small vessels. We raise our target price on Samsung Heavy Industries by 5% to W46, 200 to reflect its stable earnings and solid order flow; however, we downgrade our rating of Hanjin Heavy I&C (097230 KS/Hold) from Trading Buy to Hold. Three major domestic shipbuildersE cash flow and share performance (Wbn) 10,000 Avg. ash flow of major shipbuilders (L) Avg. share price of major shipbuilders (R) (1/31/2005=100) 1,000 6,000 800 600 2,000 400 -2,000 200 -6,000 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13F 13 14 14F 0 Source: KDB Daewoo Securities Research Analysts who prepared this report are registered as research analysts in Korea but not in any other jurisdiction, including the U. S. January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Figure 1. New orders and newbuilding price for commercial vessels (mnCGT) 100 New orders (L) Newbuilding price (R) 80 180 160 60 140 40 120 20 100 80 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13F 14F (1988=100) 200 Source: Clarkson, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 2. Three major domestic shipbuildersE order trend and forecast (Wbn) 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13F Shipbuilding Non-shipbuilding Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 3. KOSPI and shipbuilding stock index trend (1/1999=100) 1,000 KOSPI Shipbuilding stock index 800 600 400 200 0 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13F 13 14F 14 Source: KDB Daewoo Securities ResearchKDB Daewoo Securities Research 2 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Three major catalysts in 2013 1. New orders for major Korean shipbuilders to increase sharply In 2013, we expect major Korean shipbuilders will see sharp increases in new orders. Despite intensifying competition, these companies have demonstrated competitive advantages in the construction of large commercial vessels and offshore plants. We expect demand for LNG carriers will remain sound, and anticipate orders for mega-containerships will also increase.We expect the latter to be driven by small- and mid-sized shipping companies improving their competitiveness through greater efficiency. We also expect shipbuilders will be forced to take new orders at lower-than-normal prices because of the dearth of order backlogs for commercial vessels. We forecast the number of bids and orders for large offshore-plant construction projects to increase for each company in 2013. In particular, we expect orders for certain high-priced vessels, including FPSO and LNG FPSO, to increase. 2.Improved cashflow and balance sheets Since 2009, shipbuilders have taken out more loans for more orders as the proportion of heavy-tail payments (characterized by small advance payments) has increased. On a positive note, however, we expect shipbuilder loans to decrease (thus improving cashflow) as these contracts are paid off toward late 2013. We believe share prices will improve (despite concerns about lower-priced orders) thanks to increasing orders, and improved cashflow. Share prices for shipbuilders will be influenced by cashflow.Despite intensifying market competition, we anticipa te Hyundai Mipo Dockyard will take an increasing amount of orders, even though some will be lower-priced. 3. Second phase of restructuring to further consolidate industry We anticipate the shipbuilding market will remain weak due to the global economic downturn, and the tightening of ship financing. We project the current, still-surviving shipbuilding companies will aggressively seek new orders to strengthen backlogs. We believe the winners of this second phase of restructuring will benefit significantly when the market recovers.Amid the current drop in vessel construction, the percentage of bulk carriers and tankers (out of total orders) has decreased significantly, while the percentage of megacontainerships and LNG carriers has increased. We expect these trends will continue in 2013. We also anticipate major Korean shipbuilders will be able to develop new types of vessels boasting improved efficiency, which will strengthen these companiesE competitiveness. Risk factors Earnings at shipbuilders will not recover easily, due to orders at lower-than-normal prices and won appreciation. In order to secure backlogs, hipbuilders will need to take low price orders. Another risk factor is won appreciation, but at current levels, we believe risks are limited, thanks to Korean shipbuildersE technological edge, and dollar denominated payment for raw materials, which accounts for 40% of total raw material purchase. KDB Daewoo Securities Research 3 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Figure 4. Three major domestic shipbuildersE cash flow and share performance (Wbn) 10,000 Avg. cash flow of major shipbuilders (L) Avg. share price of major shipbuilders (R) (1/31/2005=100) 1,000 6,000 800 600 2,000 400 -2,000 00 -6,000 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13F 13 14 14F 0 Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 5. Korean and Chinese shipbuildersE restructuring (No. of shipuilders) 200 Korea China 160 197 120 -88. 3% 80 40 24 23 -66. 7% 8 0 2008 2012 Source: Clarkson, press re lease, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 6. Comparison of currency rates (10/2/2012=100) 105 US$/W JPY100/W EUR/W RMB/W 100 95 90 85 80 10/12 11/12 12/12 1/13 Source: KOSTAT, KDB Daewoo Securities Research KDB Daewoo Securities Research 4 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Investment strategy & valuationWe believe the P/B of KoreaEs top 3 shipbuilders, which is trading at around 1. 0x, should rebound to 1. 2x, a level seen historically as the low, thanks to the aforementioned three major catalysts. In addition, the ROE of shipbuildersE is projected to improve to 19%. And as most new orders are expected in 1H, shares are likely to show strong performance in the same period. The relative share performance of global shipbuilders has changed. Thanks to the rising proportion of offshore orders, Korean shipbuilders and Hyundai Mipo Dockyard are now grouped together with Keppl Corp. nd Sembcorp Marine (Singapore companies specialized in offshore plant). In light of the ongoing eurozone cris is and unstable global economy, shipbuilding shares are expected to trade between a P/B of 1. 0x~1. 3x. Although we believe the shares have bottomed, we do not expect a long term recovery until new building prices rebound in earnest. We suggest accumulating the shares near a P/B of 1. 0x. Shipbuilding shares will likely begin to recover full-swing from 2014, when the market starts to turnaround, along with increased orders for commercial vessels, improved cashflow, and earnings recovery.Figure 7. Major shipbuildersE ROE, P/B trends (Market cap, Wtr) 4. 0x (%) 50 3. 0x 40 90 60 2. 0x 30 20 30 1. 0x 10 0 05 07 09 11 13 13F 0 Source: Bloomberg, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 8. Relative share performances of major shipbuilders (-1Y=100) 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 1/12 2/12 3/12 4/12 5/12 6/12 7/12 8/12 9/12 10/12 11/12 12/12 1/13 HHI DSME HMD Guangzhou Shipyard Keppel Corp. SHI STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Rongsheng Heavy Sembcorp Marine Source: Bloomberg, KDB Daewoo Sec urities Research KDB Daewoo Securities Research 5 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Figure 9.New order trends (US$bn) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 HHI SHI HMD Figure 10. Order backlog trends (US$bn) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 07 08 09 10 11 12 HHI SHI HMD Source: Company Data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Source: Company Data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 11. Sales breakdown by business unit (Wtr) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 HHI 11 10 SHI 11 Construction Other Refinery Finance Green energy Electro electric systems Construction equipment Engine & machinery Industrial plant & engineering Offshore & engineering Shipbuilding Figure 12. Hyundai Heavy IndustriesE P/B trend Market cap,Wbn) 42,000 35,000 28,000 21,000 14,000 7,000 0 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13F 13 3. 0x 2. 5x 2. 0x 1. 5x 1. 0x Source: Company Data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Source: KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 13. Samsung Heavy IndustriesE P/B trend (Market cap,Wbn) 14,000 12,00 0 10,000 8,000 1. 0x 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 13F 2. 0x 6. 0x 4. 0x Figure 14. Hyundai Mipo DockyardEs P/B trend (Market cap,Wbn) 10,000 2. 5x 8,000 1. 5x 6,000 2. 0x 1. 5x 4,000 1. 0x 2,000 0. 5x 0 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 13F Source: KDB Daewoo Securities ResearchSource: KDB Daewoo Securities Research KDB Daewoo Securities Research 6 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Figure 15. Global new orders by vessel type (mnCGT) 25 LPG carrier LNG carrier Containership 20 Bulker Tanker 15 Figure 16. Newbuilding prices by vessel type (US$'000/TEU) 30 Containership (L) Tanker (R) Gas carrier (R) Bulker (R) (US$'000/DWT) 3 20 2 10 10 5 1 0 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 0 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12F 12 13F 13 0 Source: Clarkson, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Source: Clarkson, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 17. ROE-P/B comparison (P/B ,x) 3. 0 Figure 18.EPS growth-P/E comparison (P/E, x) 20 Keppel 2. 0 Sembcorp Mitsubishi HHI 1. 0 Guangzho u Sumitomo Mitsui (ROE, %) 0. 0 0 5 10 15 20 HMD S HI 15 Keppel 10 S HI Sumitomo Sembcorp HHI 5 (EPS growth, %) 0 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 Source: Bloomberg, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Source: Bloomberg, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Figure 19. Global shipbuildersE share performances (-1Y=100) 160 HHI Mitsui SHI Guangzhou HMD Sembcorp CSSC Keppel Figure 20. KOSPI and shipbuilding stock index (index) 8,000 Shipbuilding stock index KOSPI 140 6,000 120 4,000 100 2,000 80 60 1/12 3/12 5/12 7/12 9/12 11/12 1/13 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 Source: Thomson Reuters, KDB Daewoo Securities Research Source: KDB Daewoo Securities Research KDB Daewoo Securities Research 7 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Hyundai Heavy Industries (009540 KS) Buy (Maintain) Target Price (12M, W) 280,000 Share Price (01/16/13, W) 227,500 Expected Return (%) 23. 1 EPS Growth (13F, %) 17. 6 Market EPS Growth (13F, %) 19. 1 P/E (13F, x) 8. 5 Market P/E (13F, x) 9. 0 KOSPI 1,977. 45 Market Cap (Wbn) 17,290 Shares Ou tstanding (mn) 76 Avg Trading Volume (60D, ‘000) 229 Avg Trading Value (60D, Wbn) 51 Dividend Yield (13F, %) 1. Free Float (%) 59. 3 52-Week Low (W) 193,500 52-Week High (W) 346,500 Beta (12M, Daily Rate of Return) 1. 46 Price Return Volatility (12M Daily, %, SD) 2. 1 Foreign Ownership (%) 19. 6 Major Shareholder(s) Mong-Jun Jung et al. (21. 31%) Treasury shares (19. 36%) NPS (5. 08%) Price Performance (%) 1M 6M 12M Absolute -1. 7 -3. 8 -20. 7 Relative -0. 9 -12. 6 -27. 1 One step back for two steps forward ? ? ? Targeting orders of US$29. 7bn and revenues of W26. 9tr (non-consolidated) in 2013 Implemented a self-rescue plan for the first time in 40 years. Maintain Buy with TP of W280,000Maintain Buy with TP of W280,000 We maintain our Buy call on Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) with a target price of W280,000. HHI displayed weak share performance due to poor earnings and orders in 2012. However, we expect the company to record robust orders in 2013, boosted by a pickup in the offshore/onshore plant market. The companyEs earnings are anticipated to turn around in 2H13, while its cash flow should improve on massive orders and an increase in heavy-tail payments. HHIEs shares are trading at a 2013F P/E of 8. 5x and a P/B of 1. 0x, the lowest levels in the companyEs peer group.This tepid performance signals that weak 2012 orders and earnings results have been fully reflected. However, HHI has strong investment merits in 2013, as it is projected to win massive orders. Investment summary 1) The company exhibited poor orders across all business units last year, posting disappointing earnings results. In 2013, however, the company will be able to achieve its order target of US$29. 7bn in light of its strong determination to revamp its business structure. 2) The company is anticipated to receive massive offshore/onshore plant orders.In particular, the company will likely win orders for the Egina project (US$2. 5bn) and the Brass LNG project (US$3. 5bn) in 1Q. In a ddition, HHI is expected to bid for additional projects worth US$1-4bn; indeed, we believe the company will be aggressive in its order-taking efforts. 3) Orders for merchant ships, including mega containerships, LNG carriers, and LNG FSRU, will likely increase markedly in light of their superior competitiveness. 4) Exports of construction equipment and ultra-high voltage transformers should also increase on recoveries in the US and Chinese economies. ) The company has recently implemented a self-rescue plan for the first time in 40 years. While the number of applications for HHIEs early retirement plan (pushed through at end-2012) missed expectations, the company has subsequently carried out structural reform measures. We expect the companyEs long-term restructuring efforts to positively affect earnings going forward. Share price 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 1/12 5/12 9/12 1/13 KOSPI Earnings & Valuation Metrics FY 12/10 12/11 12/12F 12/13F 12/14F Revenue (Wbn) 37,342 53,712 54,741 5 8,433 63,025 OP OP Margin (Wbn) (%) 5,532 14. 8 4,536 8. 4 2,485 4. 5 3,331 5. 7 3,782 6. NP (Wbn) 4,154 2,559 1,729 2,033 2,449 EPS EBITDA FCF ROE P/E (Won) (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) (x) 54,652 6,326 88 34. 5 8. 1 33,671 5,473 -504 16. 7 7. 6 22,750 3,469 -2,260 10. 2 10. 6 26,750 4,320 2,005 11. 1 8. 5 32,218 4,768 2,297 12. 2 7. 1 P/B (x) 2. 5 1. 3 1. 1 1. 0 0. 9 EV/EBITDA (x) 6. 5 5. 3 8. 5 6. 2 5. 2 Notes: All figures are based on consolidated K-IFRS; NP refers to net profit attributable to controlling interests Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates Daewoo Securities Research 8 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Hyundai Heavy Industries (009540 KS/Buy/TP: W280,000) Comprehensive Income Statement (Summarized) Wbn) Revenues Cost of Sales Gross Profit SG Expenses Operating Profit (Adj) Operating Profit Non-Operating Profit Net Financial Income Net Gain from Inv in Associates Pretax Profit Income Tax Profit from Continuing Operations Profit from Discontinued Operations Ne t Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests Total Comprehensive Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests EBITDA FCF (Free Cash Flow) EBITDA Margin (%) Operating Profit Margin (%) Net Profit Margin (%) 12/11 53,712 46,784 6,927 2,392 4,536 4,536 -659 52 -148 3,876 1,133 2,743 0 2,743 2,559 184 2,617 2,498 118 5,473 -504 10. 8. 4 4. 8 12/12F 54,741 49,759 4,981 2,496 2,485 2,485 110 233 -240 2,595 766 1,829 0 1,829 1,729 100 1,568 1,458 110 3,469 -2,260 6. 3 4. 5 3. 2 12/13F 58,433 52,473 5,960 2,630 3,331 3,331 -448 248 -200 2,882 749 2,133 0 2,133 2,033 100 1,872 1,762 110 4,320 2,005 7. 4 5. 7 3. 5 12/14F 63,025 56,408 6,618 2,836 3,782 3,782 -338 188 -150 3,444 895 2,549 0 2,549 2,449 100 2,288 2,178 110 4,768 2,297 7. 6 6. 0 3. 9 Statement of Financial Condition (Summarized) Wbn) Current Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents AR & Other Receivables Inventories Other Current Assets Non-Current Assets Investments in Associates Property, Plant and Equipment Inta ngible Assets Total Assets Current Liabilities AP & Other Payables Short-Term Financial Liabilities Other Current Liabilities Non-Current Liabilities Long-Term Financial Liabilities Other Non-Current Liabilities Total Liabilities Controlling Interests Capital Stock Capital Surplus Retained Earnings Non-Controlling Interests Stockholders' Equity 12/11 23,076 1,610 9,525 6,478 2,359 25,924 973 15,565 2,324 49,001 25,491 14,339 8,903 2,249 5,334 3,224 1,954 30,824 16,379 380 1,100 15,399 1,797 18,177 12/12F 25,628 1,888 10,237 6,897 2,737 24,553 916 15,706 2,290 50,181 23,183 11,605 9,060 2,518 7,460 5,550 1,755 30,643 17,624 380 1,100 16,894 1,915 19,538 12/13F 28,538 3,517 10,927 7,304 2,922 24,365 716 15,703 2,264 52,903 24,136 12,388 9,060 2,688 7,602 5,550 1,896 31,737 19,141 380 1,100 18,682 2,025 21,166 12/14F 30,153 3,469 11,786 7,878 3,151 24,277 566 15,700 2,240 54,430 24,320 13,361 8,060 2,899 6,901 4,550 2,195 31,221 21,074 380 1,100 20,885 2,135 23,208 Cash Flows (Summariz ed) Wbn) Cash Flows from Op Activities Net Profit Non-Cash Income and Expense Depreciation Amortization Others Chg in Working Capital Chg in AR & Other Receivables Chg in Inventories Chg in AP & Other Payables Income Tax Paid Cash Flows from Inv Activities Chg in PP&E Chg in Intangible Assets Chg in Financial Assets Others Cash Flows from Fin Activities Chg in Financial Liabilities Chg in Equity Dividends Paid Others Increase (Decrease) in Cash Beginning Balance Ending Balance 12/11 276 2,743 3,078 853 85 -860 -4,072 -178 -1,442 -364 -1,474 -888 -1,583 -67 -34 796 347 1,206 0 -411 -448 -269 1,879 1,610 12/12F -1,972 1,829 1,907 899 85 107 -4,572 -512 -453 -3,197 -1,136 -544 -1,074 -60 406 184 2,806 3,484 0 -245 -444 278 1,610 1,888 12/13F 3,082 2,133 2,187 903 86 50 -489 -691 -407 783 -749 -770 -900 -60 0 190 -683 0 0 -245 -438 1,628 1,888 3,517 12/14F 3,345 2,549 2,220 903 84 50 -528 -859 -574 973 -895 -738 -900 -60 0 222 -2,654 -2,000 0 -245 -409 -48 3,517 3,469 Forecasts/Valuatio ns (Summarized)P/E (x) P/CF (x) P/B (x) EV/EBITDA (x) EPS (W) CFPS (W) BPS (W) DPS (W) Payout ratio (%) Dividend Yield (%) Revenue Growth (%) EBITDA Growth (%) Operating Profit Growth (%) EPS Growth (%) Accounts Receivable Turnover (x) Inventory Turnover (x) Accounts Payable Turnover (x) ROA (%) ROE (%) ROIC (%) Liability to Equity Ratio (%) Current Ratio (%) Net Debt to Equity Ratio (%) Interest Coverage Ratio (x) 12/11 12/12F 12/13F 12/14F 7. 6 10. 6 8. 5 7. 1 5. 6 6. 8 5. 7 5. 0 1. 3 1. 1 1. 0 0. 9 5. 3 8. 5 6. 2 5. 2 33,671 22,750 26,750 32,218 46,009 35,699 39,772 45,203 203,367 220,183 240,492 266,237 4,000 0 4,000 4,000 9. 6 0. 0 12. 1 10. 0 1. 6 0. 0 1. 8 1. 8 43. 8 1. 9 6. 7. 9 -13. 5 -36. 6 24. 5 10. 4 -18. 0 -45. 2 34. 0 13. 5 -38. 4 -32. 4 17. 6 20. 4 5. 9 6. 0 6. 1 6. 1 9. 3 8. 2 8. 2 8. 3 4. 1 4. 8 5. 7 5. 8 5. 7 3. 7 4. 1 4. 8 16. 7 10. 2 11. 1 12. 2 17. 3 7. 8 10. 0 11. 2 169. 6 156. 8 150. 0 134. 5 90. 5 110. 6 118. 2 124. 0 40. 8 45. 3 34. 1 22. 7 15. 7 6. 0 7. 6 9 . 2 Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates KDB Daewoo Securities Research 9 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Samsung Heavy Industries (010140 KS) Buy (Maintain) Target Price (12M, W) 46,200 Share Price (01/16/13, W) 37,850 Expected Return (%) 22. 1 EPS Growth (13F, %) 0. 6 Market EPS Growth (13F, %) 19. 1 P/E (13F, x) 9. Market P/E (13F, x) 9. 0 KOSPI 1,977. 45 Market Cap (Wbn) 8,739 Shares Outstanding (mn) 231 Avg Trading Volume (60D, ‘000) 938 Avg Trading Value (60D, Wbn) 34 Dividend Yield (13F, %) 0. 0 Free Float (%) 69. 5 52-Week Low (W) 31,650 52-Week High (W) 42,350 Beta (12M, Daily Rate of Return) 1. 57 Price Return Volatility (12M Daily, %, SD) 2. 3 Foreign Ownership (%) 32. 0 Major Shareholder(s) Samsung Electronics et al. (24. 42%) Treasury shares (6. 13%) Mirae Asset Global Investment (5. 05%) Price Performance (%) 1M 6M 12M Absolute -2. 7 4. 3 12. 3 Relative -1. 8 -4. 5 6. 0 Reliable again in 2013 ? ? ? 2013 orders and revenues forecast at US$1 4. 2bn and W14. tr Stable business operations and earnings to remain intact in 2013 Raise TP by 5% to W46,200; Maintain Buy Raise TP by 5% to W46,200; Maintain Buy We maintain our Buy call on Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) and raise our target price 5% to W46,200. In deriving our target price, we applied a 5% premium to the companyEs lowest P/B level since 2005 (1. 3x). We believe that the 5% premium is undemanding, as the company is expected to win solid orders and display stable earnings in 2013. We expect SHI to win massive orders of US$14. 2bn despite the slump in the global shipbuilding market, driven by the robust offshore plant market and the companyEs superior competitiveness.SHIEs shares are trading at a 2013F P/E of 9. 4x and a P/B of 1. 3x. We think that SHI has strong investment merits in light of its competitive edge, stable earnings, robust growth potential, and cash flow improvement. Investment summary 1) Domestic institutions are most optimistic on SHI among the thre e largest domestic shipbuilders. SHI has proven its superior competitiveness in the offshore plant business, including FLNG and drillships. As such, the company has solid earnings relative to its competitors. 2) SHI is expanding into the subsea business, and we believe that the company will be able to bolster its competitiveness in the segment rapidly. ) The commercial vessel unit, which exhibited a tepid performance last year, is likely to recover in 2013 thanks to: 1) rising mega containership orders and 2) steady orders for LNG carriers and LNG FSRU. 4) SHI is expected to display the fastest cash flow improvement in its peer group this year, backed by: 1) a rise in orders for both offshore plants and commercial vessels and 2) an increase in heavy-tail payments. As such, the company will be able to repay its debt and strengthen its financial structure. 5) SHIEs earnings should gradually increase on rising revenue contributions from the offshore plant unit. Share price 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 1/12 5/12 9/12 1/13 KOSPI Earnings & Valuation Metrics FY 12/10 12/11 12/12F 12/13F 12/14F Revenue (Wbn) 13,146 13,392 14,875 14,980 15,751 OP OP Margin NP (Wbn) (%) (Wbn) 1,433 10. 1,000 1,160 8. 7 851 1,226 8. 2 929 1,198 8. 0 934 1,355 8. 6 1,015 EPS EBITDA FCF ROE (Won) (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) 4,330 1,504 598 28. 7 3,685 1,455 1,556 19. 4 4,021 1,551 282 18. 4 4,044 1,514 931 15. 8 4,396 1,667 978 14. 9 P/E (x) 9. 5 7. 6 9. 6 9. 4 8. 6 P/B (x) 2. 1 1. 2 1. 5 1. 3 1. 1 EV/EBITDA (x) 8. 2 5. 4 6. 1 5. 5 4. 5 Notes: All figures are based on consolidated K-IFRS; NP refers to net profit attributable to controlling interests Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates Daewoo Securities Research 10 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Samsung Heavy Industries (010140 KS/Buy/TP: W46,200) Comprehensive Income Statement (Summarized) Wbn) Revenues Cost of Sales Gross Profit SG Expenses Operating Profit (Adj) Operating Profit Non-Operating Profit Net Financial Income N et Gain from Inv in Associates Pretax Profit Income Tax Profit from Continuing Operations Profit from Discontinued Operations Net Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests Total Comprehensive Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests EBITDA FCF (Free Cash Flow) EBITDA Margin (%) Operating Profit Margin (%) Net Profit Margin (%) 12/11 13,392 11,628 1,763 681 1,083 1,160 -10 -25 -32 1,150 299 851 0 851 851 0 616 616 0 1,455 1,556 10. 9 8. 7 6. 4 12/12F 14,875 12,867 2,008 766 1,242 1,226 -30 -34 0 1,196 267 929 0 929 929 0 920 920 0 1,551 282 10. 4 8. 2 6. 2 12/13F 14,980 13,017 1,962 764 1,198 1,198 4 -44 0 1,202 268 934 0 934 934 0 925 925 0 1,514 931 10. 1 8. 0 6. 2 12/14F 15,751 13,594 2,158 803 1,355 1,355 -19 -51 0 1,336 321 1,015 0 1,015 1,015 0 1,006 1,006 0 1,667 978 10. 6 8. 6 6. 5 Statement of Financial Condition (Summarized) Wbn) Current Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents AR & Other Receivables Inventories Other Current Assets Non-Current Assets Inv estments in Associates Property, Plant and Equipment Intangible Assets Total Assets Current Liabilities AP & Other Payables Short-Term Financial Liabilities Other Current Liabilities Non-Current Liabilities Long-Term Financial Liabilities Other Non-Current Liabilities Total Liabilities Controlling Interests Capital Stock Capital Surplus Retained Earnings Non-Controlling Interests Stockholders' Equity 12/11 9,617 806 4,132 540 1,905 6,797 0 5,408 86 16,414 10,539 4,425 3,232 2,883 1,231 1,004 88 11,770 4,644 1,155 423 3,610 0 4,644 12/12F 9,112 1,115 3,793 550 1,711 6,316 5 5,434 38 15,428 7,758 3,882 1,570 2,306 2,213 1,881 138 9,971 5,457 1,155 423 4,430 0 5,457 12/13F 9,229 1,264 3,820 554 1,648 6,372 5 5,506 21 15,601 7,301 3,910 1,070 2,322 1,918 1,481 188 9,219 6,382 1,155 423 5,364 0 6,382 12/14F 9,720 1,445 4,017 583 1,733 6,439 5 5,573 13 16,159 7,223 4,111 670 2,442 1,656 1,081 271 8,878 7,280 1,155 423 6,272 0 7,281 Cash Flows (Summarized) Wbn) Cash Flows from Op Activitie s Net Profit Non-Cash Income and Expense Depreciation Amortization Others Chg in Working Capital Chg in AR & Other Receivables Chg in Inventories Chg in AP & Other Payables Income Tax Paid Cash Flows from Inv Activities Chg in PP&E Chg in Intangible Assets Chg in Financial Assets Others Cash Flows from Fin Activities Chg in Financial Liabilities Chg in Equity Dividends Paid Others Increase (Decrease) in Cash Beginning Balance Ending Balance 12/11 1,341 1,150 189 294 78 75 549 1,284 150 164 -548 332 -242 -1 309 265 -1,306 -1,090 1 -108 -109 359 447 806 12/12F 351 1,131 558 297 11 -268 -1,061 34 39 -541 -276 -274 -368 -1 3 92 240 416 1 -108 -68 309 806 1,115 12/13F 1,376 934 580 299 17 -50 130 -27 -4 27 -268 -310 -370 -1 0 61 -917 -900 0 -108 -17 149 1,115 1,264 12/14F 1,408 1,015 651 302 10 -50 62 -197 -29 201 -321 -307 -370 -1 0 64 -921 -800 0 -108 -13 181 1,264 1,445 Forecasts/Valuations (Summarized)P/E (x) P/CF (x) P/B (x) EV/EBITDA (x) EPS (W) CFPS (W) BPS (W) DPS (W) Payout rati o (%) Dividend Yield (%) Revenue Growth (%) EBITDA Growth (%) Operating Profit Growth (%) EPS Growth (%) Accounts Receivable Turnover (x) Inventory Turnover (x) Accounts Payable Turnover (x) ROA (%) ROE (%) ROIC (%) Liability to Equity Ratio (%) Current Ratio (%) Net Debt to Equity Ratio (%) Interest Coverage Ratio (x) 12/11 7. 6 5. 3 1. 2 5. 4 3,685 5,296 22,582 500 12. 7 1. 8 1. 9 -3. 3 -19. 0 -14. 9 2. 8 23. 3 3. 2 4. 8 19. 4 15. 5 253. 4 91. 3 25. 8 57. 5 12/12F 9. 6 7. 2 1. 5 6. 1 4,021 5,358 26,307 0 0. 0 0. 0 11. 1 6. 6 5. 7 9. 1 3. 8 27. 3 3. 7 5. 8 18. 4 18. 9 182. 7 117. 5 7. 2 57. 9 12/13F 9. 7. 0 1. 3 5. 5 4,044 5,410 30,381 0 11. 6 0. 0 0. 7 -2. 4 -2. 2 0. 6 4. 0 27. 1 4. 0 6. 0 15. 8 16. 9 144. 5 126. 4 -10. 3 69. 5 12/14F 8. 6 6. 6 1. 1 4. 5 4,396 5,747 34,309 0 0. 0 0. 0 5. 2 10. 1 13. 0 8. 7 4. 1 27. 7 4. 1 6. 4 14. 9 19. 1 121. 9 134. 6 -22. 5 106. 2 Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates KDB Daewoo Securities Research 11 January 17, 2013 Sh ipbuilding Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (010620 KS) Buy (Maintain) Target Price (12M, W) 148,000 Share Price (01/16/13, W) 125,000 Expected Return (%) 18. 4 EPS Growth (13F, %) 45. 2 Market EPS Growth (13F, %) 19. 1 P/E (13F, x) 13. 1 Market P/E (13F, x) 9. 0 KOSPI 1,977. 5 Market Cap (Wbn) 2,500 Shares Outstanding (mn) 20 Avg Trading Volume (60D, ‘000) 121 Avg Trading Value (60D, Wbn) 14 Dividend Yield (13F, %) 1. 6 Free Float (%) 51. 6 52-Week Low (W) 102,500 52-Week High (W) 167,000 Beta (12M, Daily Rate of Return) 1. 58 Price Return Volatility (12M Daily, %, SD) 2. 4 Foreign Ownership (%) 18. 1 Major Shareholder(s) Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries et al. (46. 4%) NPS (7. 38%) Price Performance (%) Absolute Relative Shining in the dark ? ? ? 2013 target: US$3. 2bn in orders and W3. 6tr in revenues Stands to benefit most from industry restructuring Maintain Buy and TP of W148,000 Maintain Buy and TP of W148,000We maintain our Buy recommendation on Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (HMD) and our target price of W148,000. We expect HMD to maintain stable growth in orders and earnings, despite the global economic slowdown and eurozone fiscal crisis. Indeed, among small- to mid-sized shipbuilders, HMD is the company most favored by shipowners. Amid an expected further slowdown in the shipbuilding market, the company is anticipated to display distinguished share performance in 2013. Given HMDEs cash holdings of W450bn and the value of its stake in Hyundai Heavy Industries (W1. 4tr; 8. 0% of outstanding shares), we believe that the companiesE shares are currently undervalued (trading at a 2013F P/E of 13. 1x and a P/B of 0. 9x). Investment points ) We believe HMD will continue to display outstanding performance among small- to mid-sized Korean shipbuilders in 2013. Even amid intensifying competition due to limited orders and low ship prices, the company is expected to enjoy stable orders, earnings, and cash flow this year. 2) HMDEs competitiveness comes from its productivity, fi nancing capability, and the quality of its products. It also boasts strong cost competitiveness as the company purchases raw materials at relatively lower prices from the Hyundai Heavy Industries Group. 3) In the small- to mid-sized merchant ship market, the product carrier (P/C) segment, in which HMD has the strongest competitive edge, is expected to be relatively robust in 2013. ) If the shipbuilding market remains in a slump for a protracted period of time, HMD should be able to widen its gap with its peers. The company stands to benefit most from a second industry restructuring that is expected to end sometime in 2014. 1M 2. 5 3. 3 6M 6. 4 -2. 4 12M 11. 6 5. 3 Share price 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 1/12 5/12 9/12 1/13 KOSPI Earnings & Valuation Metrics FY 12/10 12/11 12/12F 12/13F 12/14F Revenue OP OP Margin NP EPS EBITDA FCF ROE P/E (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) (Wbn) (Won) (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) (x) 4,138 683 16. 5 493 24,629 741 431 14. 7 9. 1 4,624 378 8. 2 200 9,992 441 -633 5. 5 11. 2 4 ,404 126 2. 9 131 6,556 192 -563 4. 3 19. 4 4,624 191 4. 1 190 9,518 256 397 6. 4 13. 1 4,855 230 4. 235 11,770 293 416 7. 4 10. 6 P/B EV/EBITDA (x) (x) 1. 2 4. 4 0. 8 4. 2 1. 0 13. 8 0. 9 8. 6 0. 8 6. 0 Notes: All figures are based on consolidated K-IFRS; NP refers to net profit attributable to controlling interests Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates Daewoo Securities Research 12 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (010620 KS/Buy/TP: W148,000) Comprehensive Income Statement (Summarized) (Wbn) Revenues Cost of Sales Gross Profit SG Expenses Operating Profit (Adj) Operating Profit Non-Operating Profit Net Financial Income Net Gain from Inv in Associates Pretax Profit Income Tax Profit from ContinuingOperations Profit from Discontinued Operations Net Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests Total Comprehensive Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests EBITDA FCF (Free Cash Flow) EBITDA Margin (%) Operating Profit M argin (%) Net Profit Margin (%) 12/11 4,624 3,975 649 272 378 378 -63 -24 0 315 112 202 0 202 200 3 -821 -823 2 441 -633 9. 5 8. 2 4. 3 12/12F 4,404 4,002 402 276 126 126 41 -8 -2 167 41 126 0 126 131 -5 -274 -265 -9 192 -563 4. 4 2. 9 3. 0 12/13F 4,624 4,143 481 290 191 191 52 -9 -2 243 58 185 0 185 190 -5 185 194 -9 256 397 5. 5 4. 1 4. 1 12/14F 4,855 4,321 534 304 230 230 73 -10 -2 303 73 230 0 230 235 -5 230 239 -9 293 416 6. 0 4. 7 4. 9 Statement of Financial Condition (Summarized) Wbn) Current Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents AR & Other Receivables Inventories Other Current Assets Non-Current Assets Investments in Associates Property, Plant and Equipment Intangible Assets Total Assets Current Liabilities AP & Other Payables Short-Term Financial Liabilities Other Current Liabilities Non-Current Liabilities Long-Term Financial Liabilities Other Non-Current Liabilities Total Liabilities Controlling Interests Capital Stock Capital Surplus Retained Earnings Non-Controlling Interest s Stockholders' Equity 12/11 4,134 564 975 283 427 3,691 34 889 340 7,825 3,914 1,774 1,779 361 502 56 420 4,416 3,217 100 91 2,081 191 3,409 12/12F 4,994 418 1,814 231 352 3,632 35 928 341 8,626 4,499 1,850 2,253 396 999 191 781 5,498 2,912 100 90 2,172 215 3,127 12/13F 4,919 468 1,568 243 462 3,675 33 964 344 8,593 4,274 1,905 1,953 416 1,046 141 878 5,320 3,067 100 90 2,323 206 3,273 12/14F 4,878 532 1,427 255 486 3,650 31 933 347 8,527 4,071 1,991 1,643 437 993 101 865 5,063 3,267 100 90 2,519 197 3,464 Cash Flows (Summarized) Wbn) Cash Flows from Op Activities Net Profit Non-Cash Income and Expense Depreciation Amortization Others Chg in Working Capital Chg in AR & Other Receivables Chg in Inventories Chg in AP & Other Payables Income Tax Paid Cash Flows from Inv Activities Chg in PP&E Chg in Intangible Assets Chg in Financial Assets Others Cash Flows from Fin Activities Chg in Financial Liabilities Chg in Equity Dividends Paid Others Increase (Decrease) in Cash Beginning Balan ce Ending Balance 12/11 -697 202 311 62 1 -213 -1,075 -190 -54 -593 -135 441 -100 -4 400 145 93 245 0 -93 -59 -168 732 564 12/12F -816 126 78 65 2 -12 -969 -220 52 66 -50 150 -112 -4 79 186 516 601 0 -39 -46 -146 564 418 12/13F 489 185 71 64 1 10 291 247 -12 56 -58 -47 -100 -4 0 57 -392 -350 0 -39 -2 50 418 468 12/14F 432 230 62 62 1 30 212 140 -12 86 -73 23 -30 -4 0 57 -391 -350 0 -39 -2 64 468 532 Forecasts/Valuations (Summarized)P/E (x) P/CF (x) P/B (x) EV/EBITDA (x) EPS (W) CFPS (W) BPS (W) DPS (W) Payout ratio (%) Dividend Yield (%) Revenue Growth (%) EBITDA Growth (%) Operating Profit Growth (%) EPS Growth (%) Accounts Receivable Turnover (x) Inventory Turnover (x) Accounts Payable Turnover (x) ROA (%) ROE (%) ROIC (%) Liability to Equity Ratio (%) Current Ratio (%) Net Debt to Equity Ratio (%) Interest Coverage Ratio (x) 12/11 12/12F 12/13F 12/14F 11. 2 19. 4 13. 1 10. 6 8. 5 12. 9 9. 8 8. 4 0. 8 1. 0 0. 9 0. 8 4. 2 13. 8 8. 6 6. 0 9,992 6,556 9,518 11,770 13,153 9,869 12,760 14,910 146,152 130,821 138,428 148,290 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 19. 6 29. 9 20. 6 16. 6 1. 8 1. 6 1. 6 1. 6 11. 7 -4. 8 5. 0 5. 0 -40. 5 -56. 5 33. 4 14. 3 -44. 7 -66. 8 52. 2 20. 3 -59. 4 -34. 4 45. 2 23. 7 6. 1 4. 2 3. 9 5. 0 18. 1 17. 1 19. 5 19. 5 2. 5 3. 2 3. 8 3. 8 2. 3 1. 5 2. 2 2. 7 5. 5 4. 3 6. 4 7. 4 53. 8 8. 1 10. 7 15. 6 129. 6 175. 8 162. 5 146. 2 105. 6 111. 0 115. 1 119. 8 -18. 0 -4. 9 -16. 9 -27. 9 689. 5 45. 6 78. 1 109. 7Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates KDB Daewoo Securities Research 13 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Hanjin Heavy I&C (097230 KS) Hold (Downgrade) Target Price (12M, W) Share Price (01/16/13, W) 10,000 Expected Return (%) 0. 0 EPS Growth (13F, %) RR Market EPS Growth (13F, %) 19. 1 P/E (13F, x) Market P/E (13F, x) 9. 0 KOSPI 1,977. 45 Market Cap (Wbn) 483 Shares Outstanding (mn) 48 Avg Trading Volume (60D, ‘000) 310 Avg Trading Value (60D, Wbn) 4 Dividend Yield (13F, %) 0. 0 Free Float (%) 62. 6 52-Week Low (W) 10,00 0 52-Week High (W) 23,850 Beta (12M, Daily Rate of Return) 1. 43 Price Return Volatility (12M Daily, %, SD) 2. 7 Foreign Ownership (%) 9. Major Shareholder(s) Hanjin Heavy I Holdings et al (37. 38%) KB Asset Management (5. 13%) Price Performance (%) 1M Absolute -23. 4 Relative -22. 5 Unlikely to weather market slump ? ? ? Earnings unlikely to recover due to shipbuilding market slump and protracted strike Cash flow to deteriorate due to excessive debt and weak orders Downgrade to Hold Downgrade to Hold We lower our rating on Hanjin Heavy I (HHIC) to Hold from Trading Buy. We believe that the companyEs earnings and cash flow will not improve for the time being, given its tepid order performance amid the sluggish commercial vessel market, and the suspension of its Youngdo shipyard due to a strike.Although the company has recently embarked on the development of an industrial site near the Incheon port, the project is unlikely to boost operating profit markedly due to high capital requir ements and increased interest expenses. As such, the companyEs shares are unlikely to recover in the near term, in our view Although the companyEs shares are trading at a 2013F P/B of just 0. 4x, we believe that their investment merits are low. Indeed, efforts to dispose of property amid a lackluster real estate market should meet with difficulty, and continued net losses and excessive interest expenses should leave cash flow from operations uncertain. Risks ) The commercial vessel unit at the Youngdo shipyard is unlikely to recover. The slump in the global commercial vessel market is leading to a fall in orders, while intensifying competition among shipbuilders are prompting shipowners to demand discounts on ship prices. . 2) There is a growing possibility that the Subic shipyard will take new orders, as it possesses strong price competitiveness. However, as it is difficult to build highend vessels at the Subic shipyard, the companyEs earnings are unlikely to recover in the near fu ture. 3) There are many labor-management issues yet to be resolved, including one related to employees who are currently on leave due to a lack of work. ) Although HHIC is meeting its short-term capital needs through real estate disposal, the company will likely find it difficult to sell large-scale real estate assets due to the real estate market slump. Indeed, the company needs more capital to engage in the development project near the Incheon port. Given that the project is not progressing rapidly, uncertainties over the companyEs cash flow will likely persist in the long term. 5) HHIC holds massive debt (W2. 8tr). Proceeds from the companyEs planned rights offering (estimated to at W180bn) should be only equivalent to its annual interest expenses. 6M -26. 7 -35. 5 12M -47. 9 -54. 3 Share price 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 1/12 5/12 9/12 1/13 KOSPI Earnings & Valuation MetricsFY 12/10 12/11 12/12F 12/13F 12/14F Revenue OP OP Margin NP (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) (Wbn) 3,168 120 3. 8 -72 2,8 92 108 3. 7 -97 2,547 63 2. 5 -103 2,795 76 2. 7 -10 3,071 83 2. 7 -32 EPS EBITDA FCF ROE (Won) (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) -1,496 312 487 -3. 6 -2,006 200 -224 -5. 1 -2,123 148 243 -5. 7 -158 195 182 -0. 6 -466 184 146 -1. 8 P/E (x) P/B (x) 1. 0 0. 5 0. 4 0. 4 0. 4 EV/EBITDA (x) 14. 5 19. 9 24. 0 16. 9 18. 0 Notes: All figures are based on consolidated K-IFRS; NP refers to net profit attributable to controlling interests Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates Daewoo Securities Research 14 January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Hanjin Heavy I (097230 KS/Hold) Comprehensive Income Statement (Summarized) Wbn) Revenues Cost of Sales Gross Profit SG Expenses Operating Profit (Adj) Operating Profit Non-Operating Profit Net Financial Income Net Gain from Inv in Associates Pretax Profit Income Tax Profit from Continuing Operations Profit from Discontinued Operations Net Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controlling Interests Total Comprehensive Profit Controlling Interests Non-Controllin g Interests EBITDA FCF (Free Cash Flow) EBITDA Margin (%) Operating Profit Margin (%) Net Profit Margin (%) 12/11 2,892 2,665 227 140 87 108 -190 171 -2 -82 15 -97 0 -97 -97 0 -90 -90 0 200 -224 6. 9 3. 7 -3. 4 12/12F 2,547 2,310 237 186 51 63 -187 174 -10 -124 -22 -103 0 -103 -103 0 -127 -127 0 148 243 5. 8 2. 5 -4. 0 12/13F 2,795 2,516 280 204 76 76 -89 159 -5 -13 -3 -11 0 -11 -10 0 -35 -34 0 195 182 7. 0 2. 7 -0. 4 12/14F 3,071 2,764 307 224 83 83 -125 150 0 -42 -9 -33 0 -33 -32 0 -57 -56 0 184 146 6. 0 2. 7 -1. 1 Statement of Financial Condition (Summarized) Wbn) Current Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents AR & Other Receivables Inventories Other Current Assets Non-Current Assets Investments in Associates Property, Plant and Equipment Intangible Assets Total Assets Current Liabilities AP & Other Payables Short-Term Financial Liabilities Other Current Liabilities Non-Current Liabilities Long-Term Financial Liabilities Other Non-Current Liabilities Total Liabilities Controlling Inter ests Capital Stock Capital Surplus Retained Earnings Non-Controlling Interests Stockholders' Equity 12/11 2,392 854 917 361 237 4,645 66 3,144 89 7,037 2,483 811 1,603 69 2,687 2,317 329 5,170 1,864 241 644 814 2 1,867 12/12F 2,058 686 868 280 209 4,535 81 2,980 89 6,592 2,286 802 1,421 63 2,566 2,177 336 4,852 1,738 241 644 712 2 1,740 12/13F 2,077 617 925 294 228 4,487 76 2,871 89 6,564 2,384 895 1,421 69 2,369 1,977 338 4,753 1,809 346 644 701 2 1,810 12/14F 2,025 422 1,016 322 250 4,412 76 2,780 89 6,437 2,479 983 1,421 76 2,204 1,777 373 4,683 1,752 346 644 669 2 1,754 Cash Flows (Summarized) Wbn) Cash Flows from Op Activities Net Profit Non-Cash Income and Expense Depreciation Amortization Others Chg in Working Capital Chg in AR & Other Receivables Chg in Inventories Chg in AP & Other Payables Income Tax Paid Cash Flows from Inv Activities Chg in PP&E Chg in Intangible Assets Chg in Financial Assets Others Cash Flows from Fin Activities Chg in Financial Liabilities Chg in Equi ty Dividends Paid Others Increase (Decrease) in Cash Beginning Balance Ending Balance 12/11 -228 -97 246 113 0 44 -379 -192 -42 -150 2 68 -15 0 -43 126 -106 91 1 0 -198 -262 1,116 854 12/12F 316 -103 265 97 0 16 131 23 77 33 22 9 -21 0 -14 44 -488 -297 0 0 -192 -168 854 686 12/13F 194 -11 206 120 0 25 -4 -57 -13 92 3 11 -10 0 0 21 -275 -200 105 0 -180 -70 686 617 12/14F 165 -33 216 101 0 25 -28 -91 -29 88 9 10 -10 0 0 20 -370 -200 0 0 -170 -194 617 422 Forecasts/Valuations (Summarized)P/E (x) P/CF (x) P/B (x) EV/EBITDA (x) EPS (W) CFPS (W) BPS (W) DPS (W) Payout ratio (%) Dividend Yield (%) Revenue Growth (%) EBITDA Growth (%) Operating Profit Growth (%) EPS Growth (%) Accounts Receivable Turnover (x) Inventory Turnover (x) Accounts Payable Turnover (x) ROA (%) ROE (%) ROIC (%) Liability to Equity Ratio (%) Current Ratio (%) Net Debt to Equity Ratio (%) Interest Coverage Ratio (x) 12/11 57. 4 0. 5 19. 9 -2,006 323 36,806 0 0. 0 0. 0 -8. 7 -35. 9 -9. 8 RR 3. 3 8. 9 3. 2 -1. 3 -5. 1 2 . 4 276. 9 96. 3 163. 0 0. 5 12/12F -112. 3 0. 4 24. 0 -2,123 -111 34,182 0 0. 0 0. 0 -11. 9 -25. 9 -41. 8 RR 3. 3 8. 0 3. 9 -1. 5 -5. 7 1. 4 278. 9 90. 0 166. 5 0. 3 12/13F 5. 9 0. 4 16. 9 -158 1,691 24,843 0 0. 0 0. 0 9. 8 31. 8 20. 1 RR 3. 6 9. 8 4. 1 -0. 2 -0. 6 2. 1 262. 6 87. 1 152. 8 0. 4 12/14F 10. 1 0. 4 18. 0 -466 989 24,030 0 0. 0 0. 0 9. 9 -5. 8 9. 9 RR 3. 6 10. 0 4. 0 -0. 5 -1. 8 2. 4 267. 0 81. 7 157. 4 0. 5 Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates KDB Daewoo Securities Research 15January 17, 2013 Shipbuilding Important Disclosures & Disclaimers Disclosures As of the publication date, Daewoo Securities Co. , Ltd. has acted as a liquidity provider for equity-linked warrants backed by shares of Hyundai Heavy Industries and Samsung Heavy Industries as an underlying asset, and other than this, Daewoo Securities has no other special interests in the covered companies. As of the publication date, Daewoo Securities Co. , Ltd. has been acting as a financi al advisor to Hyundai Mipo Dockyard for its treasury stock trust, and other than this, Daewoo Securities has no other special interests in the companies covered in this report.As of the publication date, Daewoo Securities Co. , Ltd. issued equity-linked warrants with Hyundai Heavy Industries and Samsung Heavy Industries as an underlying asset, and other than this, Daewoo Securities has no other special interests in the covered companies. Stock Ratings Buy Trading Buy Hold Sell Relative performance of 20% or greater Relative performance of 10% or greater, but with volatility Relative performance of -10% and 10% Relative performance of -10% Industry Ratings Overweight Neutral Underweight Fundamentals are favorable or improving Fundamentals are steady without any material changes Fundamentals are unfavorable or worsening Ratings and Target Price History (Share price (—-), Target price (—-), Not covered ( ¦), Buy (^), Trading Buy ( ¦), Hold (? ), Sell (? )) * Our inves tment rating is a guide to the relative return of the stock versus the market over the next 12 months. * Although it is not part of the official ratings at Daewoo Securities, we may call a trading opportunity in case there is a technical or short-term material development. * The target price was determined by the research analyst through valuation methods discussed in this report, in part based on the analystEs estimate of future earnings. The achievement of the target price may be impeded by risks related to the subject securities and companies, as well as general market and economic conditions. W) 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 1/11 7/11 1/12 7/12 1/13 Hyundai Heavy Industries (W) 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 1/11 7/11 1/12 7/12 1/13 Samsung Heavy Industries (W) 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 1/11 7/11 1/12 7/12 1/13 Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (W) 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 1/11 7/11 1/12 7/12 1/13 Hanjin Heavy I&C Analyst Certifica tion The research analysts who prepared this report (the „Analysts†°) are registered with the Korea Financial Investment Association and are subject to Korean securities regulations. They are neither registered as research analysts in any other jurisdiction nor subject to the laws and regulations thereof.Opinions expressed in this publication about the subject securities and companies accurately reflect the personal views of the Analysts primarily responsible for this report. Daewoo Securities Co. , Ltd. policy prohibits its Analysts and members of their households from owning securities of any company in the AnalystEs area of coverage, and the Analysts do not serve as an officer, director or advisory board member of the subject companies. 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Wednesday, November 6, 2019

The Diet of Worms 1521, Luther and the Emperor

The Diet of Worms 1521, Luther and the Emperor When Martin Luther fell into disagreement with the Catholic hierarchy in 1517, he wasn’t simply arrested and carted to a stake (as some views of the medieval period might make you believe). There was plenty of theological discussion which soon turned into temporal, political and cultural considerations. One key part of this disagreement, which would become the Reformation and see the western church permanently split, came at the Diet of Worms in 1521. Here, an argument over theology (which still could have resulted in someone’s death), was fully turned into a secular conflict over laws, rights and political power, a vast pan-European milestone in how government and society worked, as well as how the church prayed and worshipped. What’s a Diet? Diet is a Latin term, and you might be more familiar with a different language: Reichstag. The Diet of the Holy Roman Empire was a legislature, a proto-parliament, which had limited powers but which met frequently and did affect law in the empire. When we refer to the Diet of Worms, we don’t mean a Diet that met uniquely in the city of Worms in 1521, but a system of government which was established and which, in 1521, turned its eye to the conflict Luther had begun. Luther Lights the Fire In 1517 many people were unhappy with the way the Latin Christian Church was run in Europe, and one of those was a lecturer and theologian called Martin Luther. Whereas other opponents of the church had made grand claims and rebellions, in 1517 Luther drew up a list of points for discussion, his 95 Theses, and sent them to friends and key figures. Luther wasn’t trying to break the church or start a war, which was what would happen. He was reacting to Dominican friar called Johann Tetzel selling indulgences, meaning someone could pay to have their sins forgiven. The key figures Luther sent his theses too included the Archbishop of Mainz, who Luther asked to stop Tetzel. He might also have nailed them up in public.Luther wanted an academic discussion and he wanted Tetzel stopped. What he got was a revolution. The theses proved popular enough for them to be spread around Germany and beyond by interested and / or angered thinkers, some of whom supported Luther and convinced him to write more in support of them. Some were unhappy, like Archbishop Albert of Mainz, who asked if the papacy would decide if Luther was in the wrong†¦The war of words began, and Luther battled by developing his ideas into a brave new theology at odds with the past, what would be Protestantism. Luther is Defended by Secular Power By mid 1518 the Papacy had summoned Luther to Rome to question him, and probably punish him, and this is where things began to get complex. Elector Frederick III of Saxony, a man who helped choose the Holy Roman Emperor and a figure of great power, felt he had to defend Luther, not because of any agreement with the theology, but because he was a prince, Luther was his subject, and the Pope was claiming clashing powers. Frederick arranged for Luther to avoid Rome, and instead go to the Diet meeting in Augsburg. The papacy, not normally one to concede to secular figures, needed Frederick’s support in picking the next emperor and in helping a military expedition against the Ottomans, and agreed. At Augsburg, Luther was interrogated by Cardinal Cajetan, a Dominican and a clever and well-read supporter of the church.   Luther and Cajetan argued, and after three days Cajetan issued an ultimatum; Luther returned quickly to his home of Wittenberg, because Cajetan had been sent by th e Pope with orders to arrest the trouble maker if necessary. The Papacy weren’t giving an inch, and in November 1518 issued a bull clarifying the rules on indulgences and saying Luther was wrong. Luther agreed to stop it. Luther is Pulled Back The debate was about far more than Luther now, and theologians carried on his arguments, until Luther just had to return and he ended up taking part in a public debate in June 1519 with Andreas Carlstadt against Johann Eck. Driven by Eck’s conclusions, and after several committees analysing Luther’s writings, the Papacy decided to declare Luther heretical and excommunicate him over 41 sentences. Luther has sixty days to recant; instead he wrote more and burned the bull.Normally the secular authorities would arrest and execute Luther. But the timing was perfect for something else to happen, as the new Emperor, Charles V, had pledged all his subjects should have proper legal hearings, while the papal documents were far from ordered and water tight, including blaming Luther for someone else’s writing. As such, it was proposed Luther should appear before the Diet of Works. The Papal representatives were aghast at this challenge to their power, Charles V tended to agr ee, but the situation in Germany meant Charles dare not upset the men of the Diet, who were adamant they should play their role, or the peasants. Luther was saved from immediate death by a struggle over secular power, and Luther was asked to appear in 1521. The Diet of Worms 1521 Luther made his first appearance on April 17th 1521. Having been asked to accept that the books he’d been accused of writing were his (which he did so), he was asked to reject their conclusions. He asked for time to think, and the next day conceded only that his writing might have used wrong words, saying that the subject and the conclusions were genuine and he stuck by them. Luther now discussed the situation with Frederick, and with a man working for the Emperor, but no one could make him recant over even one of the 41 statements the Papacy condemned him for.Luther left on April 26th, with the Diet still afraid condemning Luther would cause a rebellion. However, Charles signed an edict against Luther when he had gathered some support from those who remained, declared Luther and his supporters illegal, and ordered the writings burned. But Charles had calculated wrongly. The leaders of the empire who hadn’t been at the Diet, or who had already left, argued the edict did n’t have their support. Luther is Kidnapped. Sort of. As Luther fled back home, he was fake-kidnapped. He was actually taken to safety by troops working for Frederick, and he hid in Wartburg Castle for many months converting the New Testament into German. When he came out of hiding it was into a Germany where the Edict of Worms had failed, where many secular rulers acknowledged the support of Luther and his descendants were too strong to crush. Consequences of the Diet of Worms The Diet and the Edict had transformed the crisis from a theological, religious dispute into a political, legal and cultural one. Now it was princes and lords arguing over their rights as much as the finer points of church law. Luther would need to argue for many more years, his followers would divide the continent, and Charles V would retire exhausted by the world, but Worms ensured that the conflict was multi-dimensional, vastly harder to solve.   Luther was a hero to everyone who opposed the emperor, religious or not. Soon after Worms, the peasants would rebel in the German Peasant’s War, the conflict the princes had been keen to avoid, and these rebels would see Luther as a champion, on their side. Germany itself would divide into Lutheran and Catholic provinces, and later in the history of the Reformation Germany would be torn apart by the multi-faceted Thirty Years War, where secular issues would be no less important in complicating what was happening. In one sense Wor ms was a failure, as the Edict failed to stop the church dividing, in others it was a great success that has been said to have led to the modern world.